Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector by DeSimone, Steven M.
College of the Holy Cross
CrossWorks
Economics Department Working Papers Economics Department
7-1-2017
Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in
the Public Sector
Steven M. DeSimone
College of the Holy Cross, sdesimon@holycross.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
and the Corporate Finance Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Papers by an authorized administrator of CrossWorks.
Recommended Citation
DeSimone, Steven M., "Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector" (2017). Economics Department Working
Papers. Paper 183.
https://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers/183
 
Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector 
 
 
 
By 
 
Steven DeSimone 
 
 
 
July 2017 
 
 
 
 COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
FACULTY RESEARCH SERIES, PAPER NO. 18-02* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics and Accounting 
College of the Holy Cross 
Box 45A 
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610 
(508) 793-3362 (phone) 
(508) 793-3708 (fax) 
 
 
https://www.holycross.edu/academics/programs/economics-and-accounting 
 
 
*All papers in the Holy Cross Working Paper Series should be considered draft versions subject 
to future revision. Comments and suggestions are welcome. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Steven DeSimone, PhD 
Assistant Professor 
College of the Holy Cross 
1 College St.  
Worcester, MA 01610 
sdesimon@holycross.edu 
 (508) 793-3593 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The author gratefully acknowledges Mohammad J. Abdolmohammadi for his guidance on this 
paper as well as comments from Ari Yezegel, Gerrit Sarens, Jean Bedard, Mahendra Gujarathi, 
Joy Gray, and Stefanie Tate. The author also thanks participants at the 2016 AAA Northeast 
Regional meeting, especially Matthew Reidenbach and an anonymous reviewer, and participants 
at the 2017 European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Using a unique set of hand-collected data, this study investigates the association of (1) the 
presence of an Internal Audit Function (IAF) and (2) the use of quality assurance programs for 
the IAF with financial reporting quality in public sector organizations. Specifically, I examine if 
the presence of IAFs and the use of quality assessments therein is associated with the presence of 
financial statement audit reportable conditions and restatements in municipalities in the U.S. 
Results indicate that both the presence of an IAF and use of external quality programs therein are 
positively associated with financial statement audit reportable conditions related to internal 
control (significant deficiencies). Findings also suggest that the presence of an IAF is negatively 
associated with restatements in U.S. municipalities with populations over 100,000 at significant 
levels. The use of quality assurance programs for the IAF has no effect on the occurrence of 
restatements. The study’s findings provide insights on IAF influence over financial statement 
reporting quality in the public sector and suggest further research is necessary. Results should be 
of interest to standard setters, regulators, and pubic-sector leadership as they attempt to improve 
governmental financial reporting quality and transparency. 
 
 
 
Key Words: Internal auditing, internal audit quality, external assessments, financial reporting 
quality, audit reportable conditions, restatements  
Data availability: Please contact the author. 
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Internal Audit and Financial Reporting Quality in the Public Sector 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this study, I examine the relationships of the existence and quality of an Internal Audit 
Function (IAF) with financial reporting quality in public sector organizations. Specifically, I 
investigate whether the presence and quality of the IAF indicated by external quality assessments 
and improvement program (QAIP) in public sector organizations is associated with financial 
restatements and/or financial weakness disclosures. Use of QAIP and the public sector provide a 
unique and unexplored proxy and setting for investigation (The IIA, 2012a). 
The importance of the IAF’s role in corporate governance and financial reporting quality 
is acknowledged by academics, stock exchanges, regulators, and external auditors. Cohen et al. 
(2004) highlight the importance of the IAF for high quality financial reporting in the post 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) environment. The New York Stock Exchange requires that its listed 
companies maintain an IAF (NYSE, 2003) while NASDAQ filed a proposed rule in 2013 to 
require its listed companies to maintain an IAF (Securities and Exchange Commission 2013a).1 
These rules were generally well-received by external auditors. For example, Grant Thornton 
(2013, 1) states that “We believe that the periodic evaluation and testing of controls by an 
internal audit function … can enhance a company’s system of internal control over time.” As the 
                                                 
1 Although NASDAQ later withdrew the proposed rule change, it did so to fully consider the 42 comment letters it 
received regarding the proposal (Securities and Exchange Commission 2013b). The comment letters can be found at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasdaq-2013-032/nasdaq2013032.shtml. 
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA 2014) indicates through regulation, 
especially post-SOX, standard setters encourage the use of the IAF to help improve financial 
reporting quality. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) also makes a similar recommendation (AICPA 2014; COSO 2013). 
While much attention is given to the financial reporting quality of publicly-traded 
companies, the public sector is an important part of the economy as well, as public sector 
spending accounts for approximately 25% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (The World Bank, 
2015). The occurrence of restatements within the public sector is not inconsequential in 
frequency or magnitude (Baber et al., 2013a). In a sample of 207 municipalities from 2001-2004, 
Baber et al. (2013a) find at least one restatement in over half of the cases. The authors also find 
that those municipalities with at least one restatement face debt costs that are 35 basis points 
higher than non-restatement municipalities (the mean amount of the debt issue is $23.75 
million). Perhaps the most poignant example of a municipality restatement came in 2005 when 
the City of San Diego announced a $641 million restatement (10% of its net assets) for fiscal 
year 2002  (Greenblatt, 2005). Additionally, while internal audit has grown within the public 
sector in recent years, very little research has examined IAFs in the public sector (van Gils, 
2012). Also, most of this work is descriptive or qualitative in nature and is not specific to the 
U.S. context (cf., Carhill et al., 1989; Coupland, 1993; Sterck et al., 2005; Sterck and Bouckaert, 
2006). 
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Reliance on IAFs within publicly-traded companies is a result of corporate scandals in 
the late 1990s to early 2000s (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006). SOX (2002), Section 404 requires 
management of organizations to attest to the scope and adequacy of internal controls and 
financial reporting procedures. IAFs are often tasked with the necessary compliance work to 
assess the adequacy of these controls (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006). While the same 
attestation is not required of public sector organizations, public sector audit activities (both 
internal and external) can help enhance the accountability and transparency of financial reporting 
through financial audits (The IIA, 2012d). The public sector utilizes internal auditors for design 
of internal controls and to provide additional monitoring that impacts financial reporting 
(Peterson, 2014). 
External assessments help ensure that IAFs conform to The IIA’s quality standards per its 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (The IIA, 2012a). 
These standards promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAF. Since January 1, 2002 The 
IIA’s standards require external assessments of the IAF to be performed “at least once every five 
years, by a qualified, independent assessor or assessment team from outside the organization” 
and  “can be in the form of a full external assessment or a self-assessment verified by an 
independent assessor” (The IIA, 2012e). Yet, the IIA’s Common Body of Knowledge (CBOK, 
2010) survey of IIA membership found that only 39.7% of Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) state 
that their organizations comply with Standard 1312 requiring external assessments (CBOK, 
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2010).2 These evaluations are paid for by the assessed public sector organization and may be 
performed by external assessors, such as external auditors, the IIA, consultants, peers, or in the 
form of an internal assessment with external validation (The IIA, 2007)3. This finding suggests a 
need for research on the efficacy of external assessments as an indicator of IAF quality.  
This study provides insight on IAF contributions to financial reporting quality in public 
sector organizations. A major role of internal audit within public service organizations is to 
provide an independent appraisal and review service to determine and report on the degree of 
control exercised over financial systems (Coupland, 1993). Regulators and standard setters may 
use the results of this study to promote the importance of IAFs for a largely unexamined group of 
organizations, municipalities. Finally, this study follows the guidance and call for research 
regarding audit quality indicators from the Center for Audit Quality (2014)4. 
Cohen et al. (2004) argue that the IAF is one of four cornerstones of corporate 
governance, along with management, the board, and the external auditor. While studies 
examining the relationships between the latter three and financial reporting quality are extensive, 
                                                 
2 Although CBOK (2010) finds that 28.4% of respondents state that their IAF is less than five years old, this still 
leaves almost a third of IAFs that choose not to have an external assessment every five years. Another reason that 
organizations may not comply with the standard is that the internal audit profession is unregulated (The IIA, 2007). 
3 In a survey of U.S. organizations the IIA (2007) found that 67.6% received a full external review, 27.0% 
performed a self-assessment with an independent validation, and 5.4% had a peer review. The details of the review 
providers were not made available.   
4 While the CAQ’s Approach to Audit Quality Indicators focuses on external audit, the high level key elements 
stressed are firm leadership and tone at the top; auditor knowledge, experience, and workload; monitoring; and 
auditor reporting. This list closely parallels the IAF quality determinants stressed in SAS65/128 and prior research 
(e.g., Ege, 2015; Prawitt et al., 2009; and Lin et al., 2011). Thus, I argue that many of the same elements that 
indicate high external audit quality also indicate high internal audit quality. 
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the relationship between IAF quality and financial reporting quality has received limited 
attention in the literature. Notable exceptions are Prawitt et al. (2009), Lin et al. (2011), and Ege 
(2015). These studies use The IIA’s Global Audit Information Network (GAIN) survey data to 
study the association between IAF characteristics and financial reporting quality for U.S. public 
firms. Also, much of the research regarding the IAF and corporate governance/financial 
reporting quality is qualitative in nature (Arena and Azzone, 2009; Mihret and Yismaw, 2007) or 
focuses on external audit’s reliance on the IAF (Bame-Aldred et al., 2013; Gramling and Myers, 
2006; Mihret and Admassu, 2011; Prawitt et al., 2011). To the author’s knowledge only one 
study (Peterson, 2014) examines the IAF and financial reporting quality in the municipal setting, 
and finds no association between the presence of an IAF in municipalities and reported material 
weaknesses/significant deficiencies in internal controls.  
My study extends Peterson (2014) by (1) identifying if IAFs are involved in financial 
audits; (2) using the presence of external quality assessments as a proxy for deliberate attempts 
to improve IAF quality; and (3) examining the effects of IAFs on restatements in the public 
sector. 
In a sample of U.S. municipalities with populations over 100,000, findings indicate a 
significant positive relationship between the presence of an IAF and financial statement audit 
reportable conditions related to internal control (significant deficiencies). Results also indicate 
that the presence of an IAF is negatively associated with restatements. The use of quality 
assurance programs for the IAF also has a significant positive relationship with audit reportable 
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conditions, but no relationship with restatements. For control variables, municipalities that are 
deemed low risk have significantly fewer financial statement significant deficiencies in all 
models, while municipalities with audit committees have significantly more financial statement 
audit reportable conditions and restatements. Results for the remaining control variables are 
either mixed or insignificant. 
In the next sections I provide the research background and hypotheses, followed by the 
research method, results, and conclusion and discussion. 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Literature Review 
Prior research finds that high-quality accounting systems reduce information asymmetry 
and promote capital markets efficiency (Beaver, 1981; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001). The literature also stresses the importance of financial reporting 
monitoring mechanisms for publicly traded firms (Baber et al., 2013a; Dechow et al., 1996). 
Internal control systems and oversight are viewed as important elements of financial reporting 
quality as they may predict, and even prevent, future accounting and financial reporting issues 
(Rich and Zhang, 2014). Much of the prior research regarding the IAF’s role in corporate 
governance focuses on publicly-traded and/or for-profit organizations. Internal auditing is also 
important in the public sector as IAFs provide objective assessments of whether public resources 
are managed responsibly and effectively to achieve intended results (The IIA, 2012d). 
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The public sector can be described as a principal-agent relationship, where elected and 
appointed officials (the agents) must periodically report to the public (principals) their use and 
stewardship of resources, and the extent to which the public’s goals are met (The IIA, 2012d). 
Principles of corporate governance in the public sector include accountability, transparency, 
integrity, and equity. Through internal control and monitoring to ensure appropriate use of 
resources and accurate reporting practices IAFs reduce the risks (e.g., moral hazard) inherent in a 
principal-agent relationship. This is critical as stakeholder trust of public sector information and 
action is eroded if it is not credible and reliable, thus undermining legitimacy and the ability to 
govern (The IIA, 2012d). 
Research on “New Public Management” (NPM) stresses the importance of the IAF in the 
public sector (Sterck et al., 2005; van Gils, 2012). NPM is a set of theoretical and practical ideas 
in the field of public management (Hood, 1989). Hood (1991: 3-4) defines it as “a shorthand 
name for the set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated the bureaucratic 
reform agenda in many of the OECD countries from the late seventies.” Three of the seven 
doctrines of NPM include; transparency, measurable standards and benchmarks of performance; 
and a greater emphasis on the output controls (Hood, 1991). Some scholars see NPM as a hybrid 
between new and old practices, and not a complete shift away from the “old” public management 
mantra of input controls and procedures to output controls (Pollitt, 1995; Pollitt, 2002; Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1993).  
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This research contributes to the NPM stream of literature in that it views the relationship 
between IAFs and financial reporting outcomes is influenced by both input and output controls. 
Public sector IAFs promote credibility, equity, transparency and appropriate behavior of public 
sector officials (The IIA, 2012d). Two highly visible manifestations of this function are a public 
sector organization’s financial statements and related audit findings, specifically restatements 
and single audit reportable conditions, which I use in the current study. 
Each year, public sector organizations undergo two types of audits, a financial statement 
audit and a single audit. A financial statement audit considers the quality of the financial 
reporting of the entity and includes tests of account balances as well as internal controls over 
financial reporting. External auditors conduct financial statement audits in accordance with 
auditing standards generally accepted in the U.S and the standards applicable to financial audits 
contained in Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the U.S 
(GAO, 2011). Under a financial statement audit, the auditor expresses an opinion as to whether 
the financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) and reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material 
misstatement. 
A single audit is required under the Single Audit Act of 1984 (US Congress, 1984) and 
Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996 (US Congress, 1996)5. The purpose of the single audit 
                                                 
5 Single audits are required for any non-federal entity that receives $300,000 or more in a year in federal awards, 
while financial statement audits are required when an entity receives $500,000 or more. This includes states, local 
governments, non-profit organizations, and institutions of higher education (OMB, 2003). 
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(also called A-133 audit) is to ensure compliance with rules regarding the use of federal funds 
and whether appropriate internal controls are in place therein per the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB, 2003b). As part of single audits, external auditors perform compliance and 
internal controls tests to ensure compliance requirements are met, and that internal controls are in 
place and designed properly to ensure compliance (Peterson, 2014). Reportable conditions are 
noted in both the financial statements (material weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and material 
noncompliance) and single audits (material weaknesses and significant deficiencies), denoting 
that the internal controls in place are less than optimal. 
Post-SOX, IAFs are expected to assess internal controls, help organizations follow 
accounting standards, and report findings to boards and governing bodies. Effective public sector 
IAFs strengthen governance by materially increasing citizens’ ability to hold their public sector 
entities accountable. While external auditors provide assurance directly to the 
stakeholders/shareholders regarding financial statements, the IAF provides assurance indirectly. 
Agency theory can explain the independent role and responsibilities assigned to the IAF, and 
there is a growing consensus that IAF truly helps solve the agency problem (Cohen et al., 2004; 
Felix Jr. and Gramling, 2001; Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011).  
Existing literature suggests a positive relationship between the use of the IAF and 
financial reporting quality in publicly-traded companies (e.g., Prawitt et al., 2009; Lin et al., 
2011; Ege, 2015). However, using a sample of U.S. municipalities, Peterson (2014) finds no 
relationship between the presence of an IAF in municipalities and audit reportable conditions. 
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The author attributes this result to the inability to define the role of IAF in each of the 
municipalities. A major difference between Peterson (2014) and my study is that I am able to 
define the role of IAF for the municipalities in my sample.  
In the public sector, IAFs assess policies and procedures and provide ways to improve 
operational accountability, internal controls, and financial systems. IAFs also make 
recommendations to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of municipal operations. In summary, 
IAFs of municipalities: 
“Review internal controls, processes, and systems to identify systemic weaknesses and 
propose improvements” and “Internal auditors assess the adequacy of corporate 
governance and the control environment; the effectiveness of processes to identify, 
assess, and manage risks; the assurance provided by control policies, procedures, and 
activities; and the completeness and accuracy of information and communication systems 
and practices (The IIA, 2012d).” 
 
Accordingly, I expect that the presence of an IAF that is involved with the financial 
reporting process within public sector organizations leads to better internal controls, and thus a 
lower likelihood that audit reportable conditions exist under financial statement audits. This 
leads to my first hypothesis:     
H1a:   The presence of an IAF that is involved in the financial reporting process is 
negatively associated with the occurrence of financial statement audit reportable 
conditions in public sector organizations. 
 
Restatements are said to be a result of weak internal controls and are used as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality in prior research that examines corporate governance and audit quality 
(e.g., Abbott et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2011; Francis, 2004; Kinney Jr et al., 2004; Larcker et 
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al., 2007). The Center for Audit Quality (2014) has recently released its approach to audit quality 
indicators, which proposes the use of restatements as an indicator of low audit quality6. Public 
sector and municipal financial reporting and information are used in public policy decisions 
regarding financing, taxation, and resource allocation that significantly impact the economy 
(Rich and Zhang, 2014), thus restatements are important to many stakeholders of these 
organizations.   
Prior research suggests that the need for restatements can be identified by the 
organization itself, regulators, an independent auditor, or a combination therein. The company 
can find misstatements through internal audits and other internal control procedures (Palmrose et 
al., 2004). Research stresses that restatements in the context of poor oversight can be viewed as 
evidence of control problems (Baber et al., 2013a), and finds that the presence of weak internal 
controls is associated with a higher occurrence of restatements post-SOX (2002) (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2007). While the presence of an IAF is likely to lead to better controls around the 
financial reporting process and prevent restatements, it is also possible that the presence of an 
IAF leads to a greater likelihood of finding errors requiring restatements.   
Municipality IAFs that perform financial audits assess the reliability of specific inputs 
and outputs of the accounting process and resulting financial information, and also examine the 
presentation of financial statements given accepted accounting principles (The IIA, 2012d). I 
                                                 
6 While the focus of the Center for Audit Quality (2014) report is external audit, many of the same principles noted 
in the report apply to internal audit. Additionally, the IIA (2012d) notes that both internal and external auditors play 
an important role in the assurance of public sector financial information. 
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posit that municipalities with formal IAFs have fewer restatements due to errors than 
municipalities without IAFs. Thus:  
H1b:   The presence of an IAF that is involved in the financial reporting process is 
inversely associated with the occurrence of restatements in public sector 
organizations. 
 
IAFs in the public sector encounter varying financial reporting and compliance rules, 
performance indicators, and activities across jurisdictions. Thus, IAFs across different public 
sector organizations may need to possess diverse skills, competencies, and specializations 
(Carhill and Kincaid, 1989; The IIA, 2012d). This suggests that external quality reviews 
(assessments) are particularly useful as they provide valuable insight to IAFs in the public sector, 
and help improve quality therein (Carhill and Kincaid, 1989). IAFs of municipalities may 
undergo two types of external quality reviews; (1) assessments of compliance with The IIA’s 
standards and (2) assessments of compliance with Governmental Auditing Standards per the 
Association of Local Government Auditors (ALGA). 
The IIA’s standards state that “the chief audit executive (CAE) must develop and 
maintain a Quality Assessment and Improvement Program” (The IIA, 2012e). The IIA further 
states that external assessments are an integral part of these programs, are required every five 
years, and should: 
 Cover all facets of the IAF’s activity. 
 Evaluate the IAF’s conformance with the Definition of Internal Auditing, the Code 
of Ethics, and The IIA’s International Standards for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing. 
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 Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal audit activity. 
 Identify opportunities for improvement (The IIA, 2012b). 
 
The IIA’s Quality Assessment Manual (The IIA, 2012c) prescribes the elements of the 
IAF evaluated through external assessments and include compliance with IIA attribute, 
performance, and code of ethics standards. These elements include IAF independence and 
objectivity, proficiency and due professional care (attributes); managing the IAF, nature of IAF 
work, engagement planning, work performance, communication, progress monitoring, and risk 
management (performance); and a code of ethics (The IIA, 2012c). Results from an IIA (2007) 
survey indicate that CAEs have their IAFs undergo an external assessment to provide 
stakeholders evidence of the quality of the IAF and effectiveness of internal controls. This 
suggests that external assessments do indeed improve IAF quality. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAGS), which includes requirements and guidance for a variety of public sector 
organizations in the U.S. These standards must be followed by all professional auditors 
conducting financial audits of government and non-profit organizations receiving federal funds 
subject to the audit requirements of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB, 2003a). 
These audits are required every three years (GAO, 2011), and are very similar in purpose, scope 
and execution as the aforementioned IPPF reviews (The IIA, 2012f). Thus, the effect of the IPPF 
and GAGAS reviews are considered equals for the current research. 
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Prawitt et al. (2009) directly examine the association between IAF quality and financial 
reporting quality. The authors find a positive relationship between IAF quality and financial 
reporting quality in publicly traded firms as measured by abnormal accruals and the likelihood of 
just beating or meeting analyst forecast (Prawitt et al., 2009). Prawitt et al. (2012) extend this 
research and find that financial reporting risk is higher in firms that outsourced their IAFs to their 
Big N external auditors than those that outsourced their IAFs to other audit firms or kept the IAF 
in-house.7 These studies rely on survey data and use IAF quality indicators as prescribed by 
regulators. Lin et al. (2011) utilize similar survey data from The IIA to examine the relationship 
between IAF quality and SOX (2002) section 404 material weaknesses. The authors expand the 
IAF quality measure defined by SAS 65 to include IAF use of quality assurance techniques, and 
whether the IAF grades audit engagements in their IAF quality proxy8. They find a negative 
relationship between their IAF quality composite variable and disclosed material weaknesses. 
They also find a positive relationship between two IAF quality procedures (IAF use of audit 
engagement grading and follow up techniques) and disclosure of material weaknesses (Lin et al., 
2011). The authors suggest the latter finding to indicate a high quality IAF, which may lead to 
better internal controls and a greater likelihood that errors are detected and reported as 
restatements when necessary. Finally, Ege (2015) finds a negative association between a 
                                                 
7 Prawitt et al. (2012) control for IAF quality using a composite score that includes experience, certification, CAE 
education, time spent on financial reporting, internal auditor training hours, and IAF size. 
8 These quality assurance techniques include direct supervision; independent working paper review; audit client 
feedback; peer review by fellow staff members, working paper checklists and tick lists, and management 
participation. 
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composite measure of IAF quality (internal auditor competence, independence/objectivity, IAF 
financial work, and size) and management misconduct.9 Specifically, the author finds a lower 
occurrence of financial reporting fraud, bribery, and misleading disclosure practices when IAF 
quality is higher. 
In summary, prior research indicates that IAF quality is positively associated with 
financial reporting quality in publicly-traded firms. With the focus on internal control systems 
from SOX (2002) section 404, the IAF’s role in the financial reporting process has grown (Zain 
et al., 2006), as organizations tasked IAFs to design internal controls over financial reporting 
(Carcello et al., 2005). Although the public sector is not under the purview of SOX (2002), the 
use of the IAF for internal control and within the financial reporting process has also grown in 
public sector organizations as well (Protiviti, 2008; The IIA, 2012d). Additionally, unlike for-
profit companies, public sector organizations are service-oriented and generally not focused on 
profitability and competitiveness (Carhill and Kincaid, 1989); making it more likely for IAF 
focus to be on internal controls than consultancy activities. As strong internal controls are 
suggested to prevent material misstatements, it is likely that higher quality IAFs create better 
internal control systems that may prevent misstatements (Zain et al., 2006).  
                                                 
9 Ege’s (2015) uses the following items for each component; competence (experience, professional certifications and 
training hours), independence (reporting line and IAF use as a management training ground), and IAF financial 
work (percentage of time assisting external auditors). He also uses a factor analysis to create composite measure of 
IAF competence and objectivity. His findings are consistent with the IIA’s definitions of both (competence is the 
knowledge and skills required to perform job responsibilities, while objectivity refers to an unbiased mental attitude 
toward audit matters). 
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This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Municipalities with IAFs that have undergone an external quality assessment are less 
likely to have financial statement audit reportable conditions. 
 
H2b: Municipalities with IAFs that have undergone an external quality assessment are less 
likely to restate their financial statements. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample 
 Municipalities included in this study are limited to those considered large (populations of 
100,000 or more) by Government Accounting Standards Board Statement 34 (GASB, 1999), 
based on U.S. Census Bureau City survey (United States Census Bureau, 2013). This is because 
they must issue comprehensive annual financial reports that include; management’s discussion 
and analysis, basic financial statements including government-wide financial statements and 
fund financial statements, notes to the financial statements and additional required 
supplementary information, as some states waive this requirement for cities with populations of 
less than 100,000.10 The years covered by the sample are 2004-2014 (Post-SOX), and the sample 
is limited to municipalities that have data for at least three consecutive years. Data for this study 
is hand collected from individual municipality websites and comprehensive annual financial 
                                                 
10 Data from the U.S. census bureau shows 363 U.S. municipalities with estimated populations of 100,000 or greater 
as of 2013 per https://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2013/. I collected data for 100 of these for a total of 
926 municipality years. I used a random number generator that I applied to the aforementioned list of 363 
municipalities to select the sample.  
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reports, the U.S. Census Bureau (2013 data), Auditanalytics.com, and GASB.org, all of which 
are publicly available. Table 1 includes details of the sample by state. As shown, the sample 
includes municipalities from 30 states. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Dependent Variables 
Table 2 provides definitions and measurements of all variables in the models.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Financial Statement Audit Reportable Conditions (FSauditSDMW). Per U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget guidelines (OMB 2012a, 2012b) auditors of public sector entities must 
identify “reportable conditions”, which include deficiencies in internal controls when issues are 
deemed significant enough to warrant disclosure. These are identified as either a material 
weakness (MW) or signifncant deficiency (SD). As defined by the GAO (2011):   
“A deficiency in internal control exists when the design or operation of a control does 
not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned 
functions, to prevent, or detect and correct, misstatements on a timely basis. A material 
weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control, such that 
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s financial 
statements will not be prevented, or detected and corrected on a timely basis. A 
significant deficiency is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control 
that is less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by 
those charged with governance.” 
 
 I operationalize this with data from Audit Analytics. I use the reportable condition field 
and code the variable FSauditSDMW as 1 if a reportable condition exists (SD or MW), 0 if not. 
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Restatements (Restatement). Following prior research (Baber et al., 2013a; Palmrose et 
al., 2004) I identify restatements when the municipality comprehensive annual financial 
statements refer11 to restatements or prior period adjustments (errors) and exclude restatements 
due to implementation of GASB standards, reclassification between funds, changes in 
accounting principles, and changes in accounting estimates.  
 Additional Analyses. In addition, auditors must identify if there exists material 
noncompliance (MNC) by the auditee with applicable laws or federal grant requirements (GAO, 
2011): 
“A deficiency in internal control over compliance exists when the design or operation of 
a control over compliance does not allow management or employees, in the normal 
course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent, or detect and correct, 
noncompliance with a type of compliance requirement of a federal program on a timely 
basis. A material weakness in internal control over compliance is a deficiency, or 
combination of deficiencies, in internal control over compliance, such that there is a 
reasonable possibility that material noncompliance with a type of compliance 
requirement of a federal program will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a 
timely basis.” 
  
In an additional analysis using data from Audit Analytics, I code the variable 
FSauditMNC as 1 if MNC is noted, 0 if not for each municipality year.  
 For the annual single audit, reportable conditions include significant deficiencies and 
material weaknesses. A material weakness (MW) is a significant deficiency that results in a 
reasonable possibility that material noncompliance with a program requirement will occur 
                                                 
11  When identified in the comprehensive annual reports through reference within the financial statements or through 
footnote disclosure. 
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(GAO, 2011). A significant deficiency (SD) is a control deficiency that that is less severe than a 
material weakness, but is important enough to merit attention by those charged with governance. 
Significant deficiencies are identified with the variable SAuditSD, where 1 indicates a significant 
deficiency exists, 0 if not. Material weaknesses are identified with the variable SAuditMW, where 
1 indicates a material weakness exists, 0 if not. 
Independent Variables 
 Presence of Internal Audit Function (IAFPresent). The presence of an internal audit 
function is gathered from municipality websites and is coded as 1 if an IAF is present and 0 if 
not. 
 Presence of External Quality Assessment in Current or Prior Year (EQAIPPresentPrior). 
The presence of an external quality assessment of the IAF’s compliance with Governmental 
Auditing Standards (GAS) or The IIA’s International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF) 
Standards (The IIA, 2012a) in either the current year or any prior years within the sample period 
for the particular municipality is coded as a 1, and 0 if not.  
Control Variables  
Following prior research I control for various organization, IAF, and other variables, 
which are described below.12 
                                                 
12 Originally I planned to use whether or not the IAF of the municipality engaged in financial work. However, only 
three municipalities (for a total of 18 municipality years) in my sample did not engage in financial work. These 
cities are Independence (Missouri) Madison (Wisconsin), and Sacramento (California). Thus, I was unable to use 
this as a variable in the study. 
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State GAAP Requirements (GAAPState). Prior research suggests that restatements are less 
likely in states that require GAAP accounting in the public sector and that state accounting 
requirements may proxy for other forms of state oversight that influence financial reporting 
practices and procedures (Baber and Gore, 2008). Following prior research that examines 
financial reporting quality of public sector organizations, I control for states where the public 
sector must follow GAAP (Baber and Gore, 2008; Baber et al., 2013a; Rich and Zhang, 2014) 
and expect a negative relationship with the dependent variables. 
External Auditor Variables (Big4Auditor and StateAuditor) Results from prior research 
demonstrate that external auditor differences impact financial reporting quality. Generally, this 
research suggests that Big-N auditors provide higher quality external audits than other private 
firms, and thus help promote higher quality financial reporting (Blokdijk et al., 2006; Eshleman 
and Guo, 2014; Francis, 2004). Consistent with prior research examining IAF quality and 
financial reporting quality (Ege, 2015; Lin et al., 2011), as well as research regarding 
municipalities and financial reporting quality (Baber et al., 2013a; Rich and Zhang, 2014), I 
control for use of Big-4 versus non Big-4 auditors (Baber et al., 2013a; Peterson, 2014). Public 
sector organizations may utilize state auditors or a private auditor. Some of the limited research 
in this area finds that state auditors discover more financial reporting deficiencies than private 
CPA firms (Jakubowski, 2008; Svara, 2002). Following Peterson (2014) I also control for the 
presence of a state auditor. Higher-quality audits may either lead to better financial reporting 
quality over time or an increased likelihood to find and report audit reportable conditions or 
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restatements. Thus I do not make a directional prediction for the relationships between 
Big4Auditor or StateAuditor and the dependent variables. 
Low risk auditee (LowRiskAuditee). The U.S. Government Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) requires that external auditors of state and local government entities make a 
determination of the auditee’s audit risk (OMB, 2003c). I control for municipality audit risk 
(LowRisk) based on the external auditor’s classification and expect a negative relationship with 
the dependent variables.13 
Presence of an Audit Committee (ACPresent). The Government Finance Officers 
Association (GFOA) recommends that municipalities in the U.S. form audit committees to 
enhance the credibility of financial reporting (GFOA 2008). The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) stresses the importance of Audit Committees for municipalities (GAO, 1998). In 
2003, the GAO required each governmental entity to designate an audit committee or similar 
                                                 
13 Per the OMB (2003b) the following is the criteria for a low-risk auditee. “An auditee which meets all of the 
following conditions for each of the preceding two years (or, in the case of biennial audits, preceding two audit 
periods) shall qualify as a low-risk auditee and be eligible for reduced audit coverage in accordance with §___.520: 
(a) Single audits were performed on an annual basis in accordance with the provisions of this part. A non-Federal 
entity that has biennial audits does not qualify as a low-risk auditee, unless agreed to in advance by the cognizant or 
oversight agency for audit. (b) The auditor's opinions on the financial statements and the schedule of expenditures 
of Federal awards were unqualified. However, the cognizant or oversight agency for audit may judge that an 
opinion qualification does not affect the management of Federal awards and provide a waiver. (c) There were no 
deficiencies in internal control which were identified as material weaknesses under the requirements of GAGAS. 
However, the cognizant or oversight agency for audit may judge that any identified material weaknesses do not 
affect the management of Federal awards and provide a waiver. (d) None of the Federal programs had audit 
findings from any of the following in either of the preceding two years (or, in the case of biennial audits, preceding 
two audit periods) in which they were classified as Type A programs: (1) Internal control deficiencies which were 
identified as material weaknesses; (2) Noncompliance with the provisions of laws, regulations, contracts, or grant 
agreements which have a material effect on the Type A program; or (3) Known or likely questioned costs that 
exceed five percent of the total Federal awards expended for a Type A program during the year.” 
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body to fulfill the financial oversight role (GAO 1999). Prior research stresses the importance of 
ACs for corporate governance and the financial reporting process (Cohen et al., 2004). Research 
considering IAF quality and its association with financial reporting controls for the presence of 
an AC and/or AC characteristics (Ege, 2015; Lin et al., 2011; Prawitt et al., 2012; Prawitt et al., 
2009). While publicly traded firms in the U.S. must maintain an AC with at least one designated 
accounting expert, no such requirement is present in the public sector. Rich and Zhang (2014) 
find that the presence of an AC in municipalities leads to fewer internal control problems and are 
thus less likely to experience financial reporting failures. Thus, I control for, and expect a 
negative association between the presence of an AC and the dependent variables. 
Form of Government (CouncilManager). Prior research suggests that financial reporting 
quality is higher when the council-manager form is in place (Copley, 1992; Evans and Patton, 
1983; 1987). Additional research suggests that municipalities organized according to the council-
manager model encounter fewer restatements (Baber et al., 2013a) and report fewer material 
weaknesses in internal controls (Peterson, 2014). This is suggested to be a result of a stronger 
emphasis on accountability and transparency under the council-manager system (Svara, 2002). 
Thus, I control for form of government and expect a negative relationship between the presence 
of a council-manager form of municipal government and the dependent variables. 
City Council Election Variables (Staggered and TermLimit). Research that examines 
corporate governance in municipalities uses staggered elections and term limits as control 
variables. Staggered elections require at least two elections for citizens to replace a majority of 
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the council, increasing the potential for entrenchment. Alternatively, staggered elections may 
help ensure continuity of council knowledge, and may encourage more efficient operations 
(Peterson, 2014). Term limits require officials to rotate out of office after a set number of 
consecutive terms. Research finds that governors eligible for re-election perform better (Alt et 
al., 2011), but also finds that entrenchment due to staggered elections may lead to internal 
control problems (Baber et al., 2013b). Peterson (2014) finds mixed results when examining the 
association between these variables and audit outcomes.14 Thus, I control for the presence of 
both staggered elections (Staggered) and term limits (TermLimit) imposed on the city council of 
the municipality but make no directional predictions for either variable.  
Elected Finance Official (ElectedFinanceOfficial). I also control for whether the official 
that oversees the finance department of municipalities is elected or appointed. As the 
professional qualifications of elected versus appointed officials do not necessarily differ, the 
primary difference is the presence of an election. Following prior research I do not make a 
directional prediction of the association between this variable (FinanceOfficial) and my 
dependent variables (Peterson, 2014).  
Organization size (OrgSize). Prior research that examines the association between IAF 
quality and accounting outcomes controls for organization size (Ege, 2015; Lin et al., 2011; 
Prawitt et al., 2009). The literature regarding municipalities and financial reporting quality uses 
population as a proxy for size (Baber et al., 2013a; Peterson, 2014; Rich and Zhang, 2014). Thus, 
                                                 
14 The audit outcomes are material weaknesses/significant deficiencies in internal controls. 
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consistent with this research I control for size using the log of population, but make no 
directional prediction. 
Model Specification 
The specification of dependent and independent variables identified above can be 
modeled as binary logistic regressions, as follows: 
FSauditSDMW  = α+ 1IAFPresent + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor + 4StateAuditor 
+5Lowrisk 6ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8 Staggered + 9TermLimit 
+ 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize +     (Model 1a) 
Restatement = α+ 1IAFPresent + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor + 4StateAuditor 
+5Lowrisk 6ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8 Staggered + 9TermLimit 
+ 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize +     (Model 1b) 
 
FSauditSDMW = α+ 1EQAIPPresentPrior + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor + 
4StateAuditor +5Lowrisk 6 ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8Staggered 
+ 9TermLimit + 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize +   (Model 2a) 
 
Restatement = α+ 1EQAIPPresentPrior + 2 GAAPstate + 3Big4Auditor + 
4StateAuditor +5Lowrisk 6 ACpresent + 7CouncilManager + 8Staggered 
+ 9TermLimit + 10ElectedFinanceOfficial + 11OrgSize +   (Model 2b) 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests of Hypotheses  
Audit Reportable Conditions (FSauditSDMW). Table 3 contains descriptive statistics and 
univariate results for the audit reportable conditions dependent variable FSauditSDMW. Overall 
338 (38%) of the municipality years have a financial statement audit reportable condition (SD or 
MW), while 558 (62%) do not. This level of audit reportable conditions (SD and MW) is 
consistent with Peterson (2014). When an IAF is present the occurrence of audit reportable 
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conditions is significantly higher (65%) than when an IAF is not present (35%) (χ2=48.780, 
p<0.001). This result is inconsistent with my expectation in H1a. However, given that an IAF is 
present, when the IAF has undergone an external assessment, there is a significantly lower 
amount of audit reportable conditions (25%) than when no assessment has been completed 
(75%) (χ2=11.186, p=0.001), consistent with the expectation of H2a. For control variables, 
Big4Auditor (χ2=9.571, p=0.001), LowRiskAuditee (χ2=47.756, p<0.001), and OrgSize (T=-
7.292, p<0.001) are all negatively and significantly associated with the dependent variable 
FSauditSDMW. ACPresent (χ2=4.057, p=0.022) and CouncilManager (χ2=6.353, p=0.006) are 
both positively and significantly associated with FSauditSDMW. None of the other control 
variables are significantly associated with FSauditSDMW. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Restatements (Restatement). Table 4 contains descriptive statistics and univariate results 
for the restatements dependent variable (Restatement). Overall 213 (23%) of the municipality 
years have restatements, while 713 (77%) do not. When an IAF is present (IAFPresent) the 
occurrence of restatements is significantly lower (18%) than when an IAF is not present (27%) 
(χ2=10.562, p=0.001), in support of H1b. Also, given that an IAF is present, when the IAF has 
undergone an external assessment (EQAIPPresentPrior), there is a no significant difference in 
the occurrence of restatements (23%) than when no assessment has been completed (17%) 
(χ2=1.421, p=0.117), providing no support for H2b. For control variables, GAAPState (χ2=1.889, 
p=0.085) is negatively associated with the dependent variable Restatement at a marginally 
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significant level. ACPresent (χ2=4.567, p=0.017) and CouncilManager (χ2=3.884, p=0.025) are 
both positively and significantly associated with Restatement. None of the other control variables 
are significantly associated with Restatement. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
 
Multivariate Analysis and Tests of Hypotheses 
Correlation Matrix. Table 5 presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between 
all dependent and independent variables, where significant correlation coefficients are noted. The 
independent variables IAFPresent and EQAIPPresentPrior have positive and significant 
correlations with the dependent variable FSauditSDMW. IAFPresent has a negative and 
significant correlation with Restatement, while EQAIPPresentPrior is not significantly correlated 
with Restatement. While many other significant correlation coefficients between independent 
variables are indicated in Table 5, only the correlation between OrgSize and IAFPresent exceeds 
the critical level of 0.50, posing a potential multicollinearity problem. Thus, I drop OrgSize from 
model. In additional analyses I replace IAFPresent in favor of OrgSize and then include both 
OrgSize and IAFPresent. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Audit Reportable Conditions (FSauditSDMW). Table 6 contains results from estimated 
logistic regressions for the audit reportable conditions dependent variable FSauditSDMW. All 
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models include all control variables, except OrgSize. Model 1a tests whether IAFPresent (H1a) 
is negatively associated with FSauditSDMW. The model is highly significant (χ2=86.179, 
p<0.001) with a Pseudo R2 of 12.50% and a classification accuracy of 66.90%. Consistent with 
the descriptive results, it shows a positive and significant association between IAFPresent (β = 
0.803, p<0.001) and FSauditSDMW, thus H1a is not supported. One control variable has a 
negative and significant relationship with FSauditSDMW in this model, LowRiskAuditee  
(β=-0.781, p=<0.001). This finding indicates that the presence of an IAF may help improve the 
transparency of financial reporting by assisting both the external auditors and municipality 
leaders discharge their duties of reporting accurately to their constituencies. It may also suggest 
that IAFs of the public sector do not have the appropriate resources to install effective internal 
controls over financial reporting. None of the other control variables is significant.  
Mode 2a tests if EQAIPPresentPrior (H2a) is negatively associated with FSauditSDMW 
when the municipality does have an IAF. The model is highly significant (χ2=49.236, p<0.001) 
with a Pseudo R2 of 13.80% and a classification accuracy of 62.70%. There is a positive and 
significant relationship between EQAIPPresentPrior (β =0.563, p=0.02) and FSauditSDMW 
indicated by this model. Thus, H2a is not supported. However, this finding may indicate that 
higher-quality IAFs may be better equipped to recognize and promote the appropriate disclosure 
of internal control deficiencies. 
Two control variables have negative relationships with FSauditSDMW in this model; 
LowRiskAuditee (β=-0.652, p=0.002) and ACPresent (β=-0.311, p=0.098), both at marginally 
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significant levels. Two control variables have a significant and positive relationships with 
FSauditSDMW in this model; StateAuditor (β=1.443, p=0.003) and CouncilManager (β=11.834, 
p<0.001). None of the other control variables is significant.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Restatements (Restatement). Table 7 contains results from estimated logistic regressions 
for the restatements dependent variable (Restatement). Both models include all control variables, 
except OrgSize. Model 1b tests whether IAFPresent (H1b) is negatively associated with 
Restatement. The model is highly significant (χ2=25.289, p=0.005) with a Pseudo R2 of 4.20% 
and a classification accuracy of 76.70%. It shows a negative and significant association between 
IAFPresent (β=-0.531 p=0.002) and Restatement, providing support for H1b. This suggests that 
IAFs may help promote financial reporting quality by preventing and/or catching mistakes before 
they become misstatements within the financial statements. Two control variables have a 
positive relationship with Restatement, ACPresent (β=0.524, p=0.001) and CouncilManager 
(β=0.242, p=0.071), at significant and marginally significant levels, respectively. None of the 
other control variables is significant.  
Mode 2b tests if EQAIPPresentPrior (H2b) is negatively associated with Restatement 
when the municipality does have an IAF. The model is not significant (χ2=11.421, p=0.326) with 
a Pseudo R2 of 4.00%, and a classification accuracy of 81.20%. There is not a significant 
relationship between EQAIPPresentPrior (β=0.212, p=0.251) and Restatement indicated by this 
model. Thus, there is no support for H2b. This, along with the finding that IAFPresent is 
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negatively associated with Restatement may suggest that external reviews according to 
government auditing standards are not stringent enough to promote IAF quality or that there is 
not much variance in the quality of IAFs across municipalities, regardless of the presence of an 
external review process. ACPresent (β=0.667, p=0.035) has a positive and significant 
relationship with Restatement. None of the other control variables is significant.  
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
Additional Analyses 
 In the main models estimated above, OrgSize was dropped due to multicollinearity issues 
with the independent variable IAFPresent. Additional were estimated that including both 
IAFPresent and OrgSize. Related to H1a, when both IAFPresent and OrgSize are included in the 
model, results remain largely the same. In this model both IAFPresent (β=0.659, p<0.001) and 
OrgSize (β=0.194, p=0.031) have significant and positive relationships with FSauditSDMW. 
When including OrgSize in model 2a, results also remain the same, as EQAIPPresentPrior 
(β=2.647, p=052) remains positive, but at a marginally significant level. For the Restatements 
analyses (models and hypotheses 1b and 2b), Results also remain largely unchanged. In model 
1b, IAFPresent remains negative and significant (β=-0.476, p=0.01) and OrgSize (β=-0.74, 
p=0.544) is negative and insignificant. In model 2b EQAIPPresentPrior remains insignificant 
(β=0.248, p=0.218), while OrgSize is insignificant, (β=-0.209, p=0.154).  
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I also re-run analyses related to the Restatements dependent variables that include the 
independent variables and OrgSize. The untabulated results remain largely unchanged from the 
main analyses. Following this, I examine whether the independent variables are associated with 
income increasing versus decreasing restatements (RestatementEffect), the absolute value of 
restatements (ABSrestatement$), and the number of items errors that lead to restatements 
(RestatementItemCount). IAFPresent has a negative and significant relationship with 
RestatementItemCount and ABSrestatement$. It has not relationship with RestatementEffect. 
EQAIPPresentPrior is not significant in any of these three models. 
In a separate analysis, I examine the relationships between the independent variables and 
each financial statement audit reportable conditions separately (material weakness, significant 
deficiency, and material noncompliance). These variables are termed FSauditMW, FSauditSD, 
and FSauditMNC, respectively. IAFPresent has a positive and significant relationship with 
FSauditSD (β=0.798, p<0.001), but is insignificant in its relationship with both FSauditMW 
(β=0.019, p=0.468) and FSauditMNC (β=0.291, p<0.259). EQAIPPresentPrior has a positive 
and marginally significant relationship with FSauditSD (β =0.419, p<0.070), but is insignificant 
in its relationship with both FSauditMW (β=0.006, p=0.424) and FSauditMNC (β =0.064, 
p<0.457). 
Finally, I run analyses to examine if there are relationships between the independent 
variables and single audit reportable conditions, material weaknesses and significant deficiencies 
(SAmpSDMW ). IAFPresent (β=0.828, p<0.001) has a positive and significant relationship with 
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SAmpSDMW, while EQAIPPresentPrior (β=0.104, p=0.355) does not have a significant 
relationship with SAmpSDMW. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using a unique and hand-collected data set I examine the relationship of (1) the presence 
of an IAF and (2) the use of quality assurance programs for the IAF with financial reporting 
quality in public sector organizations. Specifically, this study investigates the association of the 
presence of IAFs and the use of quality assessments therein with the occurrence of financial 
statement audit reportable conditions and restatements in municipalities in the U.S. Results 
should help improve our understanding of the IAFs contribution to financial reporting 
transparency and quality.  
Findings from data of U.S. municipalities with populations over 100,000 suggest a 
positive and significant association of the presence of an IAF and use of IAF external quality 
programs with financial statement audit reportable conditions related to internal control 
(significant deficiencies). However, results also indicate that the presence of an IAF is negatively 
associated with restatements. This may suggest that IAFs improve financial reporting 
transparency through proper disclosure of audit reportable conditions, and also at the same time 
help promote accurate financial accounting and reporting. Further research is necessary to 
understand these findings and examine why IAFs seemingly do not prevent audit reportable 
conditions. The use of quality assurance programs (primarily according to government auditing 
standards) for the IAF has no effect on restatements. Overall findings may suggest that regulators 
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may wish to examine and update rules around Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAGS), 
especially those specific to IAF peer reviews. 
Results related to the study’s control variables find that municipalities opined to be low 
risk encounter significantly fewer financial statement audit reportable conditions while larger 
municipalities have significantly fewer audit reportable conditions, but see no difference in 
restatements. Finally, the presence of an audit committee is positively and significantly 
associated with restatements. All other controls have either mixed or insignificant results. 
Future research opportunities are available due to the limitations of the current study. 
First, the study uses the presence of external assessments of IAFs as a proxy for IAF quality. 
Future research may want to collect larger sample sizes on external assessments (and variation 
therein) or IAF quality variables and assess their effects on financial reporting therein. Second, 
the time consuming nature of hand collecting data on municipalities limited my sample to 100 of 
the 326 municipalities with populations of greater than 100,000. Future research can use this as a 
hold out sample and collect additional data from the remaining municipalities to investigate the 
issues further. Third, this study focuses on one public sector entity, municipalities. Future 
research may consider alternative types of public sector organizations, such as public 
colleges/universities, not-for-profit organizations, and state-level entities. Finally, the data 
collected does not allow for the analysis to include the size of the IAF relative to the 
municipality, thus omitting IAF resources as a variable. Future research may be able to account 
for IAF size relative to the municipality to determine if there is a resource allocation issue. 
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While this study has limitations and unexpected results, it increases our understanding of 
the variables that influence financial reporting quality in the public sector and raises interesting 
questions for future research to consider. The results should be of interest to regulators and 
public-sector leaders as they consider ways to improve financial reporting quality in government 
entities. 
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Table 1 
Sample by State 
State GAAP State? Unique Municipalities Municipalities Years 
ARIZONA Yes 4 37 
CALIFORNIA No 24 227 
COLORADO Yes 3 25 
CONNECTICUT Yes 1 10 
FLORIDA Yes 7 70 
IDAHO No 1 10 
ILLINOIS No 6 56 
INDIANA No 3 28 
IOWA No 1 7 
KANSAS No 2 20 
LOUISIANA Yes 2 20 
MICHIGAN No 2 19 
MINNESOTA Yes 2 20 
MISSOURI No 1 11 
NEVADA Yes 2 21 
NEW HAMPSHIRE No 1 10 
NEW JERSEY No 1 3 
NEW YORK No 6 46 
NORTH CAROLINA Yes 3 25 
NORTH DAKOTA No 1 10 
OHIO Yes 3 28 
OKLAHOMA No 2 21 
OREGON No 1 10 
PENNSYLVANIA No 3 28 
TENNESSEE Yes 2 22 
TEXAS No 11 96 
UTAH Yes 1 11 
VIRGINIA Yes 1 11 
WASHINGTON No 2 14 
WISCONSIN Yes 1 10 
TOTALS   100 926 
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TABLE 2 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Variable Description Definition Data Source 
FSauditSDMW  
(H1a + H2a) 
Financial Statement Internal 
Control MW or SD 
1 if MW/SD present,  
0 if not AuditAnalytics.com 
Restatement  
(H1b + H2b) Restatement 1 if restatement is present, 0 if not Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
IAFPresent Presence of Internal Audit Function 1 if IAF is present, 0 if not Municipality website 
EQAIPPresentPrior External Quality Assessment in Current/any Prior Year 
1 if EQAIP in current/any prior year,  
0 if not Municipality website 
GAAPState State GAAP Requirements  
1 if GAAP requirements in state,  
0 if not GASB.org 
Big4Auditor External Auditor Type 1 if Big 4 auditor, 0 if not AuditAnalytics.com 
StateAuditor State or CPA firm Auditor 1 if State Auditor, 0 if not AuditAnalytics.com 
LowRiskAuditee Entity deemed Low risk Audit 
1 if the entity is classified as a low-
risk audit by auditor, 
0 if not 
AuditAnalytics.com 
ACPresent Presence of an Audit Committee 1 if AC present, 0 if not Municipality website 
CouncilManager Form of Government 1 if council-manager, 0 if other Municipality website 
Staggered Staggered council election 
1 if staggered city council election,  
0 if not Municipality website 
TermLimit Term limit for Council 
1 if term limits for  city council,  
0 if not Municipality website 
ElectedFinanceOfficial Finance Official status 
1 if the finance official is elected,  
0 if appointed Municipality website 
OrgSize  Organization Size Log of net assets Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive and Univariate Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have any financial statement significant deficiency (SD) or 
material weakness (MW) (FSauditSDMW)? 
Independent Variable Expected Sign 
Yes 
or 
No? 
No:  558 
(62%) 
Yes: 338 
(38%) Statistic Significanceb 
IAFPresent (H1a) 
- 
No 328 59% 117 35% χ2=48.780 <0.001   Yes 231 41% 221 65% 
EQAIPPresentPrior (H2a) 
- 
No 201 87% 165 75% χ2=11.186 0.001   Yes 30 13% 56 25% 
GAAPState 
- 
No 360 64% 231 68% χ2=1.457 0.114   Yes 199 36% 107 32% 
Big4Auditor 
+/- 
No 508 91% 284 84% χ2=9.571 0.001   Yes 51 9% 54 16% 
StateAuditor 
+/- 
No 529 95% 320 95% χ2=0.001 0.979   Yes 30 5% 18 5% 
LowRiskAuditee 
- 
No 180 32% 188 56% χ2=47.756 <0.001   Yes 379 68% 150 44% 
ACPresent 
- 
No 250 45% 128 38% χ2=4.057 0.022   Yes 309 55% 210 62% 
CouncilManager 
- 
No 228 41% 167 49% χ2=6.353 0.006   Yes 331 59% 171 51% 
Staggered 
+/- 
No 90 16% 96 28% χ2=19.396 <0.001   Yes 469 84% 242 72% 
TermLimit 
+/- 
No 289 52% 166 49% χ2=0.564 0.453   Yes 270 48% 172 51% 
ElectedFinanceOfficial 
+/- 
No 494 88% 288 85% χ2=1.888 0.169   Yes 65 12% 50 15% 
OrgSize  
+/- 
Mean 12.23 12.69 
T=-7.292 <0.001 
  Std. Dev. 0.88 0.97 
aSee variable definitions in Table 1. 
bOne-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive and Univariate Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have a restatement (Restatement)? 
Independent Variablea Expected Sign 
Yes 
or 
No? 
No: 713 
(77%) 
Yes: 213 
(23%) Statistic Significanceb 
IAFPresent (H1b) 
- 
No 338 73% 128 27% χ2=10.562 0.001   Yes 375 82% 85 18%
EQAIPPresentPrior (H2b) 
- 
No 307 83% 65 17% χ2=1.421 0.117   Yes 67 77% 20 23%
GAAPState 
- 
No 466 76% 150 24% χ2=1.889 0.085   Yes 247 80% 63 20%
Big4Auditor 
+/- 
No 601 76% 191 24% χ2=2.523 0.112   Yes 87 83% 18 17%
StateAuditor 
+/- 
No 651 77% 198 23% χ2=0.004 0.949   Yes 37 77% 11 23%
LowRiskAuditee 
- 
No 283 77% 85 23% χ2=0.014 0.453   Yes 405 77% 124 23%
ACPresent 
- 
No 320 80% 78 20% χ2=4.567 0.017   Yes 393 74% 135 26%
CouncilManager 
- 
No 329 80% 82 20% χ2=3.884 0.025   Yes 384 75% 131 25%
Staggered 
+/- 
No 155 78% 44 22% χ2=0.114 0.736   Yes 558 77% 169 23%
TermLimit 
+/- 
No 364 77% 106 23% χ2=0.109 0.742   Yes 349 77% 107 23%
ElectedFinanceOfficial 
+/- 
No 624 77% 186 23% χ2=0.006 0.940   Yes 89 77% 27 23%
OrgSize  
+/- 
Mean 12.40 12.30 
T=1.420 0.156 
  Std. Dev. 0.97 0.81 
aSee variable definitions in Table 1. 
bOne-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-. 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  Variablea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 FSauditSDMW 1                           
2 Restatement -.031 1                         
3 IAFPresent .233** -.107** 1                       
4 EQAIPPresentPrior .157** .056 .051 1                     
5 GAAPState -.040 -.045 .105** -.063 1                   
6 Big4Auditor .103** -.053 .243** -.025 .016 1                 
7 StateAuditor -.001 -.002 -.051 .036 -.004 -.087** 1               
8 LowRiskAuditee -.231** .004 -.207** -.197** .136** -.112** .067* 1             
9 ACPresent .067* .070* .230** .183** .075* .128** -.018 -.106** 1           
10 CouncilManager -.084* .065* -.238** -.012 -.039 -.040 -.118** .178** -.038 1         
11 Staggered -.147** .011 -.258** -.181** .081* -.190** -.123** .211** -.136** .289** 1       
12 TermLimit .025 .011 .015 .105* .047 .113** -.135** -.121** .087** .010 -0.063 1     
13 ElectedFinanceOfficial .046 .002 0.061 .257** -.199** .026 -.091** -.087** .118** -.148** -.120** -.079* 1   
14 OrgSize .237** -.047 .531** .207** -.048 .361** -.043 -.367** .343** -.145** -.314** .163** .189** 1 
aSee variable definitions in Table 1. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
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TABLE 6 
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have any financial statement significant deficiency (SD) 
or material weakness (MW) (FSauditSDMW)? 
  FSauditSDMW FSauditSDMW (Model 1a) (Model 2a) 
Independent Variablea Expected Sign β Wald Sig.b β Wald Sig.b 
IAFPresent (H1a) - 0.803 24.321 <0.001     
EQAIPPresentPrior (H1b) -     0.563 4.224 0.020
GAAPState - -0.126 0.610 0.218 -0.319 1.995 0.079
Big4Auditor +/- 0.214 0.877 0.349 0.396 2.377 0.123
StateAuditor +/- 0.212 0.412 0.521 1.443 8.585 0.003
LowRiskAuditee - -0.781 25.972 <0.001 -0.652 8.561 0.002
ACPresent - -0.031 0.041 0.420 -0.311 1.671 0.098
CouncilManager - 0.051 0.101 0.375 0.808 11.834 <0.001
Staggered +/- -0.237 1.473 0.225 -0.345 1.853 0.173
TermLimit +/- -0.012 0.007 0.935 -0.034 0.025 0.875
ElectedFinanceOfficial +/- 0.071 0.096 0.757 0.455 1.689 0.194
Chi-Square (Sig.)   86.179 (<0.001) 49.236 (<0.001) 
Classification    66.90% 62.70% 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2   12.50% 13.80% 
aSee variable definitions in Table 1. 
bOne-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-. 
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TABLE 7 
Dependent Variable: Does the municipality have a restatement (Restatement)? 
  Restatement Restatement (Model 1b) (Model 2b) 
Independent Variablea Expected Sign β Wald Sig.b β Wald Sig.b 
IAFPresent (H1b) - -0.531 8.340 0.002     
EQAIPPresentPrior (H2b) -     0.212 0.452 0.251
GAAPState - -0.190 1.090 0.148 -0.122 0.188 0.333
Big4Auditor +/- -0.347 1.445 0.229 -0.375 1.231 0.267
StateAuditor +/- 0.021 0.003 0.956 0.374 0.544 0.461
LowRiskAuditee - -0.076 0.194 0.330 -0.021 0.006 0.470
ACPresent - 0.524 9.213 0.001 0.575 3.384 0.033
CouncilManager - 0.262 2.165 0.071 0.278 0.929 0.168
Staggered +/- -0.065 0.083 0.774 -0.500 2.599 0.107
TermLimit +/- 0.098 0.347 0.556 -0.201 0.535 0.464
ElectedFinanceOfficial +/- -0.005 0.000 0.984 -0.351 0.656 0.418
Chi-Square (Sig.)   25.289 (0.005) 11.421 (0.326) 
Classification    76.70% 81.20% 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2   4.20% 4.00% 
aSee variable definitions in Table 1.             
bOne-tailed for variables with an expected sign of -, two-tailed for variables with an expected sign of +/-. 
 
